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Executive summary 
 
The objectives of the research, enabled through funding support from the Natural Disaster 
Mitigation Program (NDMP) of the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) 
and with support from the Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre were to: 
• map the flow of information during fire-related emergency events to emergency 
management partners and the community; 
• identify key areas for improvement in information flows to emergency management 
partners; 
• develop a prioritisation framework for critical information to emergency management 
partners during critical incidents. 
 
 
Background 
A number of internal and external reviews and inquiries have identified the need for 
improvements to information flow, particularly to communities and other partner agencies that 
are affected or play an emergency services role. A review of documentation reveals 
considerable effort to improve information flow within various parts of the organisation and 
Incident Management System. However, senior fire and land personnel in the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE) believed that more improvement could be made and thus 
commissioned this report to review how, in fire-related events, information flow between control 
agencies and other emergency management partner organisations might continue to be 
enhanced. 
 
 
Research methods 
Data collection methods employed in the conduct of the research included: a review of previous 
inquiries into fire-related events in Victoria; a review of the international literature on large-scale 
multi-agency emergency events; interviews with 40 internal and external stakeholders with roles 
and responsibilities in fire-related emergency events, all of whom had had direct involvement in 
the 2006/07 fire season; development of a template of information needs of emergency 
partners; consultation and re-interviewing of DSE-identified critical partners in fire-related 
emergency events for feedback and confirmation of extracted information needs; development 
of information flow mapping for four specific scenarios of required information flow between 
partners; consultation for feedback and confirmation of scenarios. 
 
Overview of findings 
The report:  
• reviews what can be learned from inquiries into large-scale multi-agency coordination 
found in the international literature; 
• reviews existing documentation to identify the roles and responsibilities for provision of 
information to emergency management partners; 
• synthesises consultations with emergency management partners about their information 
needs and their satisfaction with the information they receive; 
• maps information flow within and between emergency management partners’ agencies 
in a fire-related event; 
• discusses strategies that might enable improvements in information flow. 
 
Reviews of major domestic and international incidents reveal that breakdowns of information 
flow typically occur at the boundaries of differing agencies or groups. The consequences of 
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these breakdowns increase in severity with increasing dependency and interdependency 
between agencies/interests. In the case of critical infrastructure, for example, breakdowns in 
information flow can lead to consequences as serious as, and potentially longer-lasting, than the 
incident itself. 
 
 
Roles and responsibilities 
A review of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (EMMV) shows that, in Victoria, when 
fire occurs on public land and in the country, the DSE and the Country Fire Authority are 
the control agencies. If such a fire-related emergency event escalates, stakeholders and 
communities with an interest in the event increase in both number and complexity. 
 
These stakeholders have different information needs, and frequently have information critical to 
the control agencies. These stakeholders include: 
• Those directly involved in control of the event (e.g., fire-fighters on the fire-ground; 
regional and state centres of emergency coordination); 
• Other agencies (internal and external) with direct support to operational activities (e.g., 
Parks Victoria, VicForests); 
• Other agencies with inter-dependent emergency management roles (e.g., Department 
of Human Services, State Emergencies Services, municipalities); 
• Critical infrastructure (e.g., Melbourne Water, Vic Roads, Victorian Energy Networks 
Corporation, Telstra); 
• Other levels of government and private businesses (e.g., Tourism); 
• Political sphere (e.g., Office of Emergency Services Commissioner, Victoria Emergency 
Management Council, government and relevant ministers, Members of Parliament with 
responsibility in area/portfolio); 
• Community members (e.g., general public directly and indirectly affected by the fire). 
 
As part of its initiative to improve information flow, the DSE recognises the need to proactively 
reconceptualise stakeholder involvement in fire-related emergency management to one of 
enhancing emergency management partnership arrangements. Emergency management 
partner organisations are those agencies with key roles to play, either in providing 
support to the control agencies or in the provision of services to communities for which 
those emergency partner agencies are responsible. 
 
The research conducted here reveals that there is a need for a more systemic approach to 
developing emergency management partnership arrangements.  
 
The interviews revealed that personnel involved in a fire-related emergency event had a good 
knowledge of their own role and the immediate context of their own responsibility within the 
emergency management framework and of the information needs of those with whom they 
directly inter-related. However, when asked in the interviews to map and describe information 
flow, respondents indicated a limited understanding of the need and purpose of information flow 
two steps beyond their own position. Beyond those directly connected to the work activity of the 
personnel involved, there was also a limited understanding of why other stakeholders might 
need key information and what they might need to do with that information. 
 
It is reasonable to expect that personnel involved in a fire-related emergency event would not 
have (or need) a detailed understanding of the activity of all others involved in the emergency 
management arrangements. Nevertheless, given the increasing need for interoperability 
between agencies, the need to provide good coordination and service between agencies in 
times of emergency, and the need to manage many different community and political agendas, 
there is an increasing requirement for all actors involved in an event to have at least some 
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understanding of the broader emergency management frameworks within which they play a 
role. It is important that they have some understanding of the connection between their roles 
and responsibilities and the critical implications of what they know or need to know for the work 
of others. 
 
Difficulties of information flow are likely to be exacerbated when the municipal coordination 
points have not “scaled up” in time. On the control agency side, even though there are protocols 
for scaling up from the fire-ground to an incident management team and for activating the state 
level of emergency coordination, how the regional level is activated is still vague. There is also a 
need for clearer guidelines about what triggers control agencies can reasonably expect will lead 
to the scale-up of both Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre (MECC) and Divisional 
Emergency Coordination Centre (DECC) levels of coordination.  
 
While multiple coordination points are inevitable in any complex system, each of these 
coordination points represents a boundary where the opportunity exists for failure in information 
flow between groups. When a fire is escalating and the coordination points are also in need of 
activation or scaling up, potentials for disconnects in information flow are amplified. 
 
 
Emergency partner information needs 
The consultation with emergency management partners identified a broad range of information 
needs. It should be noted that the themes identified here were ones raised in the interviews by 
respondents when they discussed the information they needed; respondents were not asked 
who they thought should provide that information. Responses were grouped around five themes: 
• Information pertaining to the dynamic changes occurring to manage the event as well as 
information about the event itself (e.g., the emergency management arrangements in 
place, the plans in use, the assets at risk, predictions of the fire and its behaviour); 
• Information pertaining to the control agency’s operational needs (e.g., personnel 
involved, catering requirements); 
• Community information needs (details included in the incident information plan such as 
meetings planned, distribution deadlines for newsletters); 
• Community needs (demographic profile; emergency relief centres; recovery centres; 
requirements for habitation; road closures; warnings; alternative arrangements in, for 
example, school transportation system); 
• Health-related information needs (e.g., smoke concentration, plume modelling, livestock 
losses). 
 
Responses received from representatives from emergency partner organisations have indicated 
that all agencies want information on how the control agencies are managing the event. In terms 
of the operational needs of the fire-combat agency, all partners responding to date wanted to 
know about road closures and road access. Many partners also wanted to have information on 
how control agencies were providing communities with needed information. Community 
information needs and health-related needs were more specific and localised (e.g., of interest to 
municipalities and DHS respectively).  
 
As part of the consultation, emergency management partners were also asked to comment on 
their levels of satisfaction regarding: 
• whether their information needs are currently being met; 
• the modality currently used to disseminate information; 
• the timeliness of information received; and 
• the relevance of information received. 
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From the perspective of information provided from the DSE, recent improvements in the way 
were noted and there is general satisfaction with the information provided. There are however, 
some areas identified that are still in need of improvement. Dissatisfaction with the timeliness of 
the information received continues to be problematic and appears to be an issue for most of the 
internal and external partners consulted. This raises issues of information flow both within the 
Incident Management Team and between the various layers of regional and state coordination 
within the agency responsible for control of the fire(s).  
 
 
Mapping information flow 
The report maps the different areas of responsibility and different information flow patterns 
needed between: 
1. levels in the control structure; 
2. the fire control structure and the municipal and other arrangements articulated in the 
EMMV; and 
3. emergency management partner organisations. 
 
The report also maps the information flow arrangements needed in four different scenarios: 
Information flow needed to: 
1. activate a road closure (traffic management point); 
2. manage a threat to electrical power infrastructure; 
3. relocate a human service facility; and 
4. manage access to emergency relief for a family of self-evacuees. 
 
The maps identify where information flow for the particular scenario is critical and what flows 
need to be prioritised. 
 
Information needs to communities are also discussed. Different geographic communities can be 
identified in terms of their relationship to the proximity of the fire. 
 
 
Strategies to improve information flow 
From the research reported and discussed, 33 strategies are identified to improve information 
flow between agencies responsible for controlling fire-related emergency events and emergency 
management partner organisations. They include: 
• utilising a range of information communications technologies (Pod-casting; developing 
shared databases);  
• engaging in training (for control agency personnel; inter-agency training exercises; 
leadership development) 
• reviewing roles and responsibilities (within the information unit; in liaison with other 
points of coordination; relationships between information management teams (IMT) and 
Integrated Fire Agency Coordination Centres (IFACC) when activated) 
• enhancing agency inter-operability and planning 
• reviewing protocols for scale-up of regional control levels (IFACC) as well as municipal 
coordination and support (DECC) 
• addressing partner organisation information needs (templates, protocols for activation 
and authorisation) 
• further investigation into fire-ground/IMT information flow and into partner agency 
information needs 
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1 Introduction 
The Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) is committed to building 
partnerships to develop ‘more resilient relationships between communities, stakeholders and 
partners who are affected by or deliver fire management services across Victoria’ (DSE 2005, 
p. 8). At the heart of this strategic agenda is an acknowledgement that successful fire 
management involves ensuring that partner stakeholders, affected businesses and 
communities have timely, accurate and relevant information to assist in their planning and 
decision making so that they can take appropriate action.  
 
These strategic objectives are part of a whole of government approach to achieve ‘greater 
public participation and more accountable government’ (Growing Together goal, 2005) and 
‘improved stewardship of public and private land’ (DSE Outcome, 2005). 
 
The objectives of this research project are to: 
1. map the flow of information during fire-related emergency events to emergency 
management partner organisations and the community; 
2. identify key areas for improvement in information flows to emergency management 
partner organisations; 
3. develop a prioritisation framework for critical information to emergency management 
partner organisations during critical incidents. 
 
The research reported here was enabled through funding support from the Natural Disaster 
Mitigation Program (NDMP) of the Department of Transport and Regional Services 
(DOTARS) to support community partnerships. 
1.1 Background context 
A number of internal and external reviews and inquiries have identified the need for 
improvements to information flow, particularly to communities and other partner agencies 
which are affected or play an emergency services role.  
 
The need for greater alignment between the control functions and the Victorian Emergency 
Management arrangements was raised by Victorian Emergency Services Commissioner 
Bruce Esplin, in his review of the 2002/03 Victorian Bushfires. Recommendations from this 
inquiry included:  
• integrating community information units into incident management teams to facilitate 
information flow to communities; 
• facilitating a better understanding between incident management teams and 
Municipal Emergency Response Coordination Centre arrangements; and that 
• all emergency services give greater priority to information management. 
 
In reviewing the debrief outcomes from the 2005/06 fire season, Smith (2007) recognised the 
improved integration and cooperation between response agencies (DSE and CFA) and also 
noted improvements in community engagement. This continued in the 2006/07 fire season. 
 
A review of documentation reveals considerable effort to document information flow within 
various parts of the organisation and incident management system – see, for example, Code 
of practice for fire management on public land (DSE 2006a); Issue paper on provision of fire 
information and intelligence (DSE 2006b); Emergency management framework (DPI/DSE/PV 
2006).  
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It is evident that progress has been made in establishing frameworks: 
• for improving operational procedures in support of managing fire on public land (e.g., 
Implementation plan: public land fire initiative, CorpSupport 2006);  
• in managing inter-agency responsibilities in emergencies (Emergency management 
framework, DPI/DSE/PV 2006); and  
• in establishing working relationships across agencies in terms of ensuring seamless 
transition from response to recovery (State Emergency Recovery Planning 
Committee Framework 2006). 
 
Initiatives from a range of internal reviews (see Attachment 1) have addressed issues of 
strategies developed in: 
• staffing 
• processes and procedures 
• resources 
• authorisation protocols and distribution 
• VBIL and internet 
• public meetings and forums 
• ABC and SMS and pod casting. 
 
These have resulted in improvements in information flow, especially to communities. For 
example, in comparing the community-related information flow reported in Smith’s reports 
(2006, 2007) it can be seen that there have been considerable increases in information flow 
to communities. The number of calls made to the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) in 
peak fire activity periods, for example, rose from 17,400 in the 2005/06 fire season to 49,000 
calls in the 2006/07 season. Moreover, the call abandonment rate for the same period 
dropped from 19% in 2005/06 to 6% in 2006/07, despite a 2.5-fold increase in the number of 
calls (see Figure 1). In addition, there has been increased usage of the internet revealing the 
demand from the community for up-to-date and relevant information.  
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Figure 1: Comparison between 2005/06 and 2006/07 fire seasons: calls to VBIL and call-
abandonment rate. Source: Smith 2007 
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Figure 2: Comparison 2005/06 and 2006/07 fire seasons: usage of internet. 
Source: Smith 2007 
 
 
While these statistics are compelling, senior land management from DSE Land and Fire, felt 
that there was still room for improvement, in particular in developing related information needs 
of partner organisations involved in emergency management coordination and support and 
those who have an emergency services role in times of fire-related emergency events. 
 
At the heart of this issue is the need to view fire-management within a wider emergency 
management context. While building on the improvements in fire-related emergency response 
integration, Smith (2006) concluded the fire-management agencies 
must necessarily be supported by other key participants in the emergency 
management arena … [A] good understanding of the capabilities and capacities of 
other organisations and how they mesh into the emergency management picture are 
intrinsic elements of sound emergency management (p. 24). 
 
Smith also discussed how it is important that all parties (i.e. communities, media and fire 
agency representatives) understand what that role is and how the information flows via the 
chain of command. As a result of the 2005/06 debriefs and a joint CFA/DSE strategic 
workshop in 2006, ‘sustainability of information flow during emergency events’ was still 
identified as a key priority (Smith 2007). This has been articulated into a plan to provide clear 
coordinated information (see Attachment 2). 
 
The research reported here assists in facilitating these initiatives by: 
• documenting possible communication scenarios so that appropriate ways of 
managing information needs can be developed prior to the fire season; and 
• providing a basis for enabling the development of protocols to plan for strategic and 
proactive communication to executives of partner organisations as a fire develops. 
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2 Methods employed 
2.1 Research project scope and outputs 
The scope and outputs required included:  
• a summary of legislative responsibilities with regards to dissemination of information; 
• identification of the key internal and external information clients/audiences at local, 
regional and state levels; 
• identification of risks to information flow and potential information flow blockages;  
• identification of the triggers for the scaling up of information flow for critical 
information at different escalation levels, the type of information needed and the 
emergency management partners to be involved; 
• review, with respect to information, the definition of roles and responsibilities during 
fire-related emergencies and the critical stages of a fire-related incident. 
 
The following research methods were employed in order to deliver the required outputs: 
• a review of documentation; 
• interviews with 40 personnel (DSE and CFA) involved in fire-related emergency 
management during the 2006/07 fire season; 
• analysis of key information needs of external emergency management partner 
organisations, and mapping information flows to support those needs. 
 
2.1.1 Review of documentation 
The review of documentation involved examination of: 
• reports on international emergencies to extract lessons learned (Attachment 1); 
• recommendations made in previous inquiries and reports pertaining to information 
flow to communities (extracts Attachment 4); 
• legislative requirements for information dissemination to communities as set out in the 
Emergency Management Manual of Victoria (EMMV); 
• the Australasian Fire Authorities Council Position on Bushfires and Community Safety 
(extracts Attachment 5); 
• the Australasian Fire Authorities Council Inter-Service Incident Management System 
(AIIMS) manual outlining roles and responsibilities for information flow to communities 
(extracts Attachment 6); 
• the Department of Sustainability and Environment’s (2006) Code of Practice for Fire 
Management on Public Land (extracts Attachment 7); 
• joint CFA/DSE review of effectiveness of information flow to communities and media 
during fire incidents (Schauble 2006); 
• key issues identified from operational reviews of major fires in Victoria, 2006/07 
(Smith 2006, 2007); 
• information provided by the DSE on feedback received post 2006/07 fire season 
(analysis on this documentation Attachment 8), including: 
o notes taken at debrief meetings conducted with incident management staff, 
IFACC staff and community members (Gippsland, Traralgon and Swifts Creek) 
February–March 2007;  
o feedback submissions (n=28) completed as part of the DSE’s own after action 
review (AAR) process, received from personnel directly involved in the 2006/07 
fires. These include personnel who were: 
• undertaking information/community engagement roles at an information unit 
at IMT level (n=15);  
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 5 of 67 
• working at a regional IFACC level (n=2); 
• involved with the Emergency Coordination Centre, in information unit 
positions (n=8); and 
• from liaison/support agencies (n=3: VBIL, police, DHS) 
2.1.2 Interviews 
In Phase One, 40 interviews were conducted with 18 internal personnel (DSE and CFA) and 
22 representatives of external emergency management partner organisations (see 
Attachment 3). All interviewees had direct experience in the (DSE/CFA) 2006/07 fires and 
many had experience in the 2005/06 fires. As indicated in Table 1, the interviewees had 
experience in various parts of the emergency management framework.  
 
Table 1: Location of interviewees in emergency managements arrangements.  
 
 
 
Fire-related control 
Coordination 
arrangements 
(EMMV) 
Emergency 
management 
partners 
State 10 6 6 
Regional 4 2 4 
Local 4 4  
Total 18 12 10 
 
In terms of personnel involved in fire-related control, a number of DSE and some CFA 
personnel were interviewed who discussed their roles in the ECC (state), the IFACC 
(regional), as well as involvement in IMT (local) level during the 2006/07 fires. Personnel 
operating within the coordination arrangements, as specified in the EMMV were also 
interviewed. These personnel had responsibilities in a MECC (local, municipal) level, or at a 
Divisional (regional) level. Some had state-wide role responsibilities. Emergency 
management partner organisations included personnel involved in the provision of services, 
either to the DSE/CFA or to the communities, such as the provision of critical infrastructure. 
 
Personnel were requested to provide an outline of their experiences and their perspectives 
about areas that worked well and where improvements were needed. The questions asked of 
interviewees can be found in Attachment 9a. In addition, respondents were asked to draw a 
map illustrating their understanding of how information flowed through the system and, in 
particular, how it flowed to emergency management partner organisations. Interviews were 
conducted for durations of 40 to 120 minutes and were audio-recorded. The responses were 
transcribed and coded against a template to capture: 
• flow of information at local, regional and state levels; 
• identification of information needs of emergency management partner organisations 
and dependencies; 
• what was the content of the information and what were the possible risks; and 
• for blockage and needed triggers. 
 
Attachment 10 contains a brief synthesis of the findings from the interviews, together with 
some examples of extracts from the interviews that provided the data for the development of 
the findings discussed in the rest of the report.  
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2.2 Analysis and feeding back of data 
In Phase Two, 10 representatives from emergency management partner organisations were 
repeat interviewed to confirm the emerging areas of information needed by them. The 
questions asked of the interviewees can be found in Attachment 9b. Tables of the key 
information needs of key emergency management partner organisations were developed, as 
were maps of information flow. The tables were returned to participants for further feedback 
and confirmation. Based on the information discussed, maps of information flow were 
developed to illustrate selected communication scenarios. These were then tested with 
partner representatives. It is envisaged that the templates used here (tables and maps) can 
be used to further develop future scenarios. 
 
 
3 Lessons learned from reviews of international major 
incidents 
This section provides a review of findings concerning information flow from inquiries into five 
major international emergency incidents: 
1. a severe six-month flooding event in France (2001);  
2. the 9/11 World Trade Center attack (2001);  
3. the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 
4. the 7/7 London Underground bombings;  
5. hurricane Katrina (2005) 
 
A full summary of these findings is presented in table form in Attachment 3. Table 1 in 
Attachment 3 provides a summary of the four incidents reviewed in this section by providing 
the name of the incident, the nature of the incident, the impact of the incident and the number 
of agencies involved in the management of the incident. From this analysis key themes can 
be identified. 
 
3.1 Pre-response: Narrow focus in learning from other emergencies 
According to the literature, much can be learned from other emergencies, though direct 
transfer of findings can be problematic. For example, it was found in the review of the London 
Underground bombings on 7 July 2005 that emergency planners may have drawn the wrong 
lessons from the World Trade Center attacks on 9 September 2001. The report concluded 
that the ‘most striking failure’ of the emergency response was that in the case of the World 
Trade Center attacks many people were killed, with few survivors, whereas in the London 
Underground bombings a relatively small number of people were killed but there were several 
hundred injured survivors. As a consequence of attempting to transfer learning too directly 
from one incident to preparedness for another, there was a lack of planning for the injured 
and traumatised victims. 
 
In addition, it is important to recognise that each type of emergency carries with it a particular 
set of circumstances and contingencies unique to the nature of the emergency and the 
specifics of the jurisdictions in which they occur.  
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of consistent issues concerning information flow, which 
arise variously at all of the emergency incidents reviewed.  
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3.2 Response: Multi-agency difficulties in coordinating across 
jurisdictions 
Most of the attention given in the inquiries relates to the agency response to the impact. Key 
lessons learned are summarised in Table 2 in Attachment 3, where the following categories of 
issues are identified as problematic in terms of information flow. 
1. A lack of suitable communications infrastructure, including a lack of compatibility 
between data systems and communications technologies; 
2. Communication difficulties between coordination centres and the incident ground; 
3. Poor integration of different agencies’ ‘response’ plans; 
4. Poor and varied levels of situational awareness among emergency management 
partner organisations; 
5. Systemic and personal failure; 
6. Lack of timeliness and accuracy in information dissemination. 
 
In the analysis the main reasons for these breakdowns relate, systemically, to 
• what has been described as the ‘ad hoc’ nature of emergency response work which 
tends to be dynamic and uncertain;  
• the asymmetrical levels of knowledge and experience between the agencies involved; 
• the varying levels of familiarity with emergency response tools and procedures; and  
• the often divergent knowledge of the roles and functions of individual emergency 
response personnel. 
 
The exchange of timely and accurate information and the capacity of disparate agencies to 
find, absorb and adapt to that information is fundamental to the ability of those same agencies 
to integrate their activities (Comfort & Kapucu 2006).  
 
3.3 Response and recovery: The interdependencies of impact 
One of the consistent observations from the review is that although the affect of the impact in 
each of the emergencies was severe, so too was the loss of critical infrastructure and the 
subsequent damage to community functioning, making restoration and recovery a far longer 
process than officials envisaged. 
 
For example, in the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, the electrical power generation and 
distribution system for lower Manhattan was destroyed, the water distribution system was 
disabled and the gas pipelines were heavily damaged. Telephone and telecommunication 
services were also seriously disrupted. In the London Underground bombings 3,000 adults 
and children were registered as suffering from post-traumatic stress, and officers in every 
London borough were diverted to public reassurance duties. In the severe flooding in France 
15,000 people were without water for 15 days.  
 
It is these interdependencies that highlight the criticality of the need for close interoperability 
which, sadly, was reported more frequently as lacking than it was present. 
 
3.4 Lessons learned from the international literature 
Comfort and Kapucu (2006, p.310) identify three basic sets of conditions which could affect 
the interactions between agencies involved in responding to emergency events. They are: 
1. the technical structure needed to support information search and exchange; 
2. the organisational policies and procedures that shape action both within and among 
the participating organisations; 
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3. cultural openness to new information, new strategies for addressing an unimaginable 
set of problems and willingness to adapt to extraordinarily difficult conditions. 
 
There are some key ideas here that may be elaborated and adapted for Australian contexts.  
 
Communications technology. There are the obvious admonitions about not relying on single 
providers for telecommunication infrastructure and to build in redundancy to such systems.   
 
Building accessible information sources. One idea that draws from the post-London bombing 
experience is that of building extranet databases that can contain meaningful information for 
emergency management partner organisations and which can be accessed by them on their 
own on an as-needs basis. This is suggested as an alternative to attempting to build 
compatible technological systems that can directly share information. This same kind of 
database could be used to provide a source for reliable and timely information for businesses. 
 
Public education and awareness. There is work that can be done educating the public about 
the use of the communications infrastructure in times of emergency, in particular, the need for 
the public to keep mobile communications to a minimum in times of critical response. 
 
There are also recommendations in the literature about developing and promoting uniform 
alerts and warning calls and signs, and it is noted that considerable advancements have been 
made already by the DSE/CFA on this aspect. 
 
Proactive media monitoring. In a number of crises, Katrina and the 9/11 World Trade Center 
attacks in particular, it was noted that the media were presenting inaccurate information. 
Information released to the media should be monitored for inaccuracies and inconsistencies 
(all electronic communications, including television interviews, should be time stamped). It 
was also suggested that the media should be involved in emergency management training 
exercises.  
 
Applying new technologies. One finding from the 9/11 World Trade Center attack involved the 
recognition of the profound difference made in the city’s ability to respond to the challenges 
through geographic information system (GIS) applications, which allowed graphic 
representations to be shared across agencies that supported rescuer and cleanup efforts. 
 
Enhancing inter-operability. Suggestions from the literature include better training and 
resources for communications, information and liaison personnel. Agreeing on and 
committing to uniform credentials for support staff would also assist in providing for easier 
integration of recovery services. 
 
These improvements, as well as other particular aspects that can be gleaned from  
Table 3 in Attachment 3, provide a means enabling response and recovery personnel to build 
a shared awareness of the issues before, during and after events. 
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4 Review of roles and responsibility  
 
The Forests Act gives the DSE its powers/legislative responsibility for managing fire-related 
emergencies on Public Land in Victoria. Processes for managing emergencies are supported 
by the Emergency Management Act (1986) and the Emergency Management Manual of 
Victoria (EMMV).  
 
The Manual distinguishes between the agency responsible for the emergency (the control 
agency) and other agencies that are designated as having a ‘support role’. The manual 
defines a control agency as: 
‘the agency nominated to control the response activities for a specified emergency’ 
and a support agency as ‘a government or non-government agency which provides 
essential services, personnel, or material to support or assist a control or another 
support agency or persons affected by an emergency’ (EMMV 2003, pp. 3–4). 
 
In fires on public land (i.e., for all fires in Victoria that occur in State forest, National Parks and 
Protected Public Lands), the DSE is identified in the EMMV as being the control agency. 
Victorian Government agencies, such as Parks Victoria (PV), Department of Primary 
Industries (DPI), Melbourne Water, VicForests (VF), form part of what is referred to in policy 
documentation as Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO) partner organisations. These 
agencies work with the DSE to contribute crews to control activities. Throughout the rest of 
this report they will be referred to as NEO agencies. NEO agencies, together with the Country 
Fire Authority (CFA), Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFESB) are named 
as support agencies in the EMMV (see Table 2). For fire occurring outside these areas but 
within the Country Area of Victoria, the CFA is designated as the control agency and the DSE 
is listed as the primary support agency (Smith 2007, pp. 7–31). 
 
Table 2: Responsibility for fire and/or explosion. Source: EMMV, Section 7, 2007 
 
FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION 
Emergency Control Agency (varies by 
location) 
Support Agencies 
Explosion CFA/MFESB DPI 
Fire (on public land) DSE Parks Victoria, DPI, Melbourne 
Water, VF CFA, MFESB 
 
 
The DSE works closely with the CFA when there are multiple fires and the current practice is 
for these agencies to share responsibility for fire control functions (CFA.DSE 2006). Doing so 
allows the combat agencies to share responsibility for different fires and to coordinate their 
actions through their respective Regional and State levels of coordination.  
 
A number of after-action reviews (see, for example, Smith 2006, 2007) have noted the 
increasing cooperation and enhanced integration of fire response between the DSE and the 
CFA. For example, in the 2006/07 fires, a new coordinating mechanism known as the 
CFA/DSE IMT support desk was set up for the first time in the DSE Emergency Coordination 
Centre (ECC). This unit serviced both DSE-led and CFA-led fire-fighting efforts. For the 
purposes of this report, references to agencies fulfilling a fire control function in bushfire-
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fighting will refer to both DSE and CFA, though it is acknowledged that the DSE sponsored 
this research with support from the Natural Disaster Mitigation Program. 
 
4.1 Organising for emergency management response 
Both the DSE and the CFA are committed to using the Australasian Inter-Service Incident 
Management System (AIIMS) as the framework for managing fire-related emergency events 
(AFAC 2005, see Attachment 11). AIIMS is described as ‘a common management framework 
to assist with the effective and efficient control of incidents’ (AFAC, 2005, p 14). The AIIMS 
manual (2005, p. 10) defines control, command and coordination of an incident: 
Control is the overall direction of emergency management activities in an emergency 
situation. Authority for control is established in legislation and may be in an 
emergency plan and carries with it the responsibility for tasking other organisations in 
accordance with the needs of the situation. Control relates to situation and operates 
horizontally across organisations. 
 
Command is the internal direction of the members and resources of an agency in the 
performance of the organisation’s roles and tasks by agreement and in accordance 
with relevant legislation. Command operates vertically within an organisation. 
 
Coordination is the bringing together of organisations and other resources to support 
an emergency management response. It involves the systematic acquisition and 
application of resources (organisational, human and equipment) in an emergency. 
 
AIIMS provides a common management system, the principal component of which is the 
Incident Management Team (IMT). The AFAC AIIMS manual notes that the ultimate 
responsibility for managing an incident always remains with the Incident Controller ‘whether 
an Incident Management Team has been established or not’ (AIIMS, p. 29). An IMT will be 
activated when the incident escalates to a level of complexity that requires the management 
and coordination of resources. When an IMT is activated it consists of four sections: control, 
planning, operations and logistics. In addition to the Incident Controller having ‘overall 
responsibility for the management of all activities undertaken to control the incident’ (AIIMS, p. 
25) the Incident Controller also has responsibility for the: 
• management of the interface with organisations and people working outside the 
incident management structure; and the  
• management of the interface with organisations, communities and people affected by, 
or likely to be affected by, the incident’ (AFAC 2005, p. 25). 
 
When an IMT is activated the management of the information flow from within the IMT to 
emergency management partner organisations takes place in the Information Unit, 
established within the Planning Section. The Information Unit is responsible for information 
flows outlined in Figure 3, extracted from AIIMS manual.  
 
The key function of the Information Unit is to provide timely, accurate and relevant information 
in regard to the incident’s cause, size current situation to a range of stakeholders, including 
government, other agencies and locally affected and broader community. It is the first point of 
contact for the media, the public and other agencies for general information about the incident 
(AIIMS manual 2005). 
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 11 of 67 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Information Unit information flow responsibility. 
Source: AFAC 2005, p. 45 
 
 
Considerable work over the past few years has gone into developing the capability of the 
Information Unit. In 2007 the DSE and the CFA jointly prepared a set of Guidelines to 
articulate responsibilities and protocols as an enabler to developing a fully integrated 
information service (yet to be fully realised). The Guidelines for the AIIMS Information Unit 
(2007) specify the size and composition of staff and lateral linkages to the Integrated Fire 
Agency Coordination Centre (IFACC) in terms of the DSE and the Regional Emergency 
Coordination Centre (RECC) in the case of the CFA. Figures portraying these relationships as 
described in the Guidelines are found in Attachment 12.  
 
To address deficiencies in information flow identified in previous inquiries (see for example 
Smith 2006, 2007) particularly to the community, the Information Unit has developed a 
sophisticated array of tools and dissemination strategies. The personnel employed within an 
Information Unit have also grown to a considerable extent as the delineation of roles for 
specific purposes continues to mature (see Figure 4).  
 
Attachment 12 also provides illustration of how, in the course of the commencement of a fire 
designated as a Level 1 or Level 2 incident, an Information Officer will work with an Incident 
Controller prior to the activation of the IMT. Once the IMT is established the Information Unit 
sits within the Planning Section. Figure 4 provides a representation of the Information Unit 
and its personnel in a Level 3 incident.  
 
In the interviews conducted with DSE staff (and in the post 2006/07 fire season review 
documentation included in Attachment 8), there appears to be some confusion about where 
the Information Unit sits within the AIIMS structure. Some personnel thought that the 
Information Unit reported (within AIIMS) directly to the Incident Controller, and if this was not 
the case, then it needed to be so. 
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Figure 4: Position of the Information Unit and personnel in the IMT in a Level 2/3 incident.  
Source: Information Unit Guidelines 2007 
 
 
In recognition of the importance of the need for good information management, the authors 
are aware that the role of the Information Unit and its reporting position is also under internal 
review to consider whether the Information Unit should report directly to the Incident 
Controller. In reviewing the Information Unit Guidelines, the Project Team concur with the 
sentiments expressed earlier, that a strong relationship is needed between the Information 
Unit section and the Incident Controller, and thus conclude that a revision of AIIMS is worthy 
of consideration.  
 
However, the critical issue is that all sections within an Incident Management Team need to 
be operating as a fully integrated unit for the team to work effectively. Only when all units and 
functions effectively share informational resources efficiently will the entire performance of the 
whole Incident Management Team be lifted. Changing the reporting structure of one unit will 
not fix a deeper systemic problem of information flow within an Incident Management Team. 
The risk is that parallel information processing begins to occur, which would seem to 
constitute a greater risk to achieving successful outcomes than solving an information flow 
problem by moving the Information Unit. It seems important to address internal mechanisms 
with information flow within the planning unit of the IMT, as will be discussed later in the 
report. 
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There are other impediments to information flow between the IMT and the Community. In a 
couple of interviews (i.e., a minority) there were reports of Incident Controllers who did not 
seem to share the importance of keeping the community well informed. From the perspective 
of these respondents, there are still Incident Controllers operating in the system who believe 
that community members will panic if they are advised of the fire situation. In one particular 
case, difficulties in being able to access the Incident Controller were exacerbated by a 
Planning Officer who was not fully forthcoming about what was discussed in the briefings, 
from which the Information Unit were excluded. Under these circumstances it was very 
difficult for an Information Unit section to be effectively performing.  
 
That said, it is important that a decision to shift the Information Unit reporting is not made 
because of the occasional ineffectiveness that has been reported; or because of a lack of 
appreciation of the Information Unit role by other members of the IMT. The above case 
example indicates that there were probably other aspects of that IMT that were not working 
well, and extracting the Information Unit would probably have only resolved some of the 
teamwork difficulties. It is important that Information Unit staff see themselves as part of a 
fully functioning team and that they have the confidence to speak up if their needs are not met 
such that the effectiveness of their own job function is jeopardised. There are protocols that 
have been developed in other high-reliability industries to facilitate making a demand, 
particularly when there is a high power-distance between members of the team. These enable 
staff members with low power/authority to speak up if they see something that has been 
observed and is going wrong. 
 
In terms of the Victorian Emergency Management Framework, it is interesting to note that the 
EMMV does not explicitly identify control agencies (such as the DSE or the CFA) as having a 
responsibility to provide information to the community; however, the AFAC AIIMS policy does. 
In part, this is because the Emergency Management Act and the EMMV were developed 
before the implementation of AIIMS and possibly because of state-national differences in 
conceptualising the issues.  
 
In the EMMV, the arrangements and responsibility for warning the community lies within the 
local municipal council. Part 4 of the Emergency Management Act specifies the legislative 
requirements of councils, who among other activities must ‘appoint one or more Municipal 
Emergency Resource Officers (MERO) to coordinate the use of municipal resources for 
emergency response and recovery’ (EMMV 2001, S6–24). 
 
According to the EMMV (2006, S6–32), council response activities include: 
• Establishing and operating centres and facilities such as a Municipal Emergency 
Coordination Centre (MECC), and 
• Facilitating the provision of information: 
o as warnings to the community in consultation with other agencies; and 
o as information to public and media in consultation with control agencies. 
 
Given the growth and success of the Information Units within the control agencies in providing 
information to support emergency management partner organisations and to the community 
during the two previous fire seasons (see Smith 2007), it will be important to clarify roles and 
responsibilities in coordinating information sharing between Information Units and between 
fire control agencies and their counterparts in the MECC. Information disseminated to the 
community needs to be role-specific to ensure information provision is systematically 
managed across the emergency partner organisations to reflect roles and responsibilities. 
There is a risk if MECCs, for example, begin providing warnings about a fire-hazard. Likewise, 
there is a risk if control agencies create bottlenecks to information being disseminated to 
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support communities. This will be discussed in the next section, having first elaborated on the 
variety of partner organisations, other stakeholders and their information needs. 
 
 
4.2 Clients/audiences and their information needs 
In this report various audiences who represent different ‘communities of interest’ have been 
identified, all of whom have a stake in (a) helping the DSE to manage fire-related incidents as 
effectively as possible, and (b) expecting to be kept informed about that management so that 
they can make their own decisions and take their own actions. The audiences are wider than 
those listed in the EMMV, taking account of the differing interests and subsequent roles and 
responsibilities different audiences will be involved with.  
 
From the perspective of the fire control agencies, those audiences are either internal or 
external to their operation and either directly or peripherally involved in the event.  Table 3 
provides an overview of the kinds of audiences, identifying the type of audience and their 
different roles in the event.  
 
Table 3: Types of audiences. 
 
Type of audience Examples of agencies/stakeholders 
Internal audience critical to fire 
control of the event 
Fire-fighters on the fire-ground; Regional/State levels 
of fire control agencies  
Other agencies (internal and 
external) with direct support to 
operational activities 
SES, Vic Police, NEO agencies, MFESB, Local 
Government, CFA 
Other agencies (internal and 
external) with inter-dependent 
emergency management roles 
DHS, NEO agencies, Dept for Victorian Communities, 
Local Government, CFA (Regional and Groups 
remaining for additional surge demands) 
Critical infrastructure   Water Authorities, National Electricity Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO), The Victorian 
Energy Networks Corporation (VENCorp), aviation 
points, Telstra, Rail links and key cables, gas 
Other levels of government and 
private businesses  
Those agencies and private business operators who 
are directly or indirectly affected (e.g., tourist 
operators, including alpine resorts; beekeepers) 
Political sphere  Office for the Emergency Services Commissioner; 
Victorian Emergency Management Group; Members 
of Parliament (locally affected); Ministers; government 
Community members 
 
Community members who are directly affected 
through threat, or impact of fire or smoke; those who 
are indirectly affected and the general public.  
 
 
As can be seen from the above table, there are groups of clients or audiences that will have 
different needs based on their different levels of involvement in the event and its proximity to 
their interest. These audiences may include fire-fighters on the fire-ground, as well as 
emergency management partner organisations involved in supporting operational 
requirements (e.g. SES). Other emergency management partner organisations such as the 
DHS have a role to play in the emergency management effort. Other agencies may have 
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roles involved in the supply of critical infrastructure that may be directly or indirectly impacted, 
or have a general business that is likely to be affected. The political sphere of government 
also needs to be kept informed in order to consider the broader impacts and contingencies for 
all levels of the community. In addition there are members of the general public who, 
depending on their proximity to the fire, will have differing information needs.  
 
According to the EMMV, an incident involves several overlapping activities. The Emergency 
Management Act emphasises the need to ‘ensure that prevention, response and recovery are 
organised within a structure which facilitates planning, preparedness, operational coordination 
and community participation’ (S4A). In this regard, it is important to situate control agency 
response activity within a suite of complementary activity involving emergency preparation 
and recovery. The EMMV defines prevention, response and recovery, ‘not as phases or 
stages of emergency management … [but] as clusters of activities. They take place as 
needed, and do not necessarily follow one another in a sequential order’ (EMMV, pp.1–7). 
These clusters of activity are illustrated in  
Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Examples of emergency management activities. 
Source: EMMV 1–6 
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Table 4 outlines seven activities that occur during an incident, which include pre-response 
through the course of the fire and its impact, as well as recovery and normalisation. For 
purposes of reporting these activities, they are presented in layers as a ‘snapshot’, but this is 
not to suggest that these activities occur in a linear manner. As indicated in  
Figure 5, the activities overlap. 
 
The table shows the roles and responsibilities and the lateral relationships between each of 
the key personnel during the various activities of the incident, as designated in the policy 
documentation reviewed. It is interesting to note that the policy documents reviewed do not 
specify how an Incident Controller at the ICC (local level of response control), or the State 
Duty Officer at the ECC (state level of response coordination), requests activation of the 
municipal support and coordination body (MECC) or what triggers are needed for this process 
to occur.  
 
The EMMV identifies that the MERC activates the MECC. However, there are also no explicit 
references to provide guidance as to how a MECC might escalate its activities and scale up, 
as there is in the AIIMS framework for managing incident response for control agencies. 
Development of these guidelines would be useful, both for personnel within a MECC, as well 
as for personnel in an IMT. 
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Table 4: Roles and responsibility for information flow, and source of authority 
 
 
Activity occurring 
in incident 
 
Role 
 
Responsibility 
 
Lateral Role 
relationships 
 
Source 
 
 
Pre response 
 
DSE/CFA Community 
Education/preparedness 
 
Community 
Engagement Officer 
 
PV, local councils and 
regional bodies 
 
DSE Community 
Engagement policy 
 
Initial response/ 
notification 
 
Response and Incident 
management 
 
Incident Controller 
 
MERC.(MECC) 
 
AIIMS, EMMV 
Notification of estab of IMT 
 
Incident Controller SDO (ECC) 
CFA/SECC 
 
Notification to establish 
activation of a MECC 
 
MERC DERC 
Council 
IC  
EMMV 
 
Notification to communities 
likely to be affected 
 
Incident Controller 
 
 
SDO (ECC/ 
DO/IFACC) 
CFA (SECC) 
 
MERC (MECC) 
 
 
AIIMS 
 
EMMV 
SEWS warning Incident Controller 
advice to MERC 
 
MERC to authorise 
 
MERC (MECC) 
 
SDO (ECC) 
EMMV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Escalation 
 
Notification to external partner 
organisations 
Incident Controller MERC (MECC) AIIMS 
 
Engagement/ 
Containment 
 
Management of the incident 
 
Incident Controller 
 
MERC (MECC) 
 
DERC (DEC) 
 
AIIMS, Heads of 
agreement  
 
(DSE/CFA) 
 
Management of de-escalation 
of incident 
 
 
 
Incident Controller 
 
 
Department of Human 
Services  
 
MERC (MECC) 
 
EMMV, 
 
DHS 
 
 
Mopping up/ 
 
Post impact 
 
Transition to authority of 
recovery agencies 
 
Jointly convened 
meeting, control 
agency+ LGA + DHS 
 
Local Government 
Authority (LGA), 
 
Department of Human 
Services (DHS) 
 
DPI 
 
DSE/CFA/DHS 
Framework for 
transition from 
response to recovery, 
2006 
 
Recovery 
 
 
Support communities to 
achieve normal community 
activities 
 
Recovery  
Co-coordinator (LGA) 
 
Department of Human 
Services 
 
DSE/CFA/DHS 
Framework for 
transition from 
response to recovery, 
2006 
 
Normalisation 
 
Support communities to 
achieve normal community 
activities 
 
Local government 
authority 
 
Department of Human 
Services 
 
DSE/CFA/DHS 
Framework for 
transition from 
response to recovery, 
2006 
 
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 18 of 67 
 
5 Identifying information needs of partner organisations in 
emergency services 
 
Table 5 provides a synopsis of the types of information identified as important by the 
emergency management partner organisations interviewed. The template used here was 
developed from one previously employed in an earlier project to identify resource tracking 
requirements, conducted by the Office for the Emergency Services Commissioner. The 
template was then embellished from the information needs identified in consultation with 
emergency management partner organisations in the event of a fire-related event. This 
template was then circulated to representatives from emergency partner organisations for 
their comment/validation. This constituted the second phase of the data gathering process.  
 
In consulting emergency management partners about their information needs, a broad range 
of needs were identified. It should be noted that the themes identified here were ones raised 
in the interviews and then respondents were canvassed about whether or not they thought 
their agency would benefit from having this information. Although some of the sources of who 
would provide such information are obvious, agency respondents were not asked who they 
thought should provide this information. It should also be pointed out that no emergency 
partner expected that the DSE would be the source of all types of information. The 
information needs identified in the consultation process were grouped around five themes: 
• Emergency information: pertaining to the dynamic changes occurring to manage the 
event as well as information about the event itself (e.g., the emergency management 
arrangements in place, the plans in use, the assets at risk, predictions of the fire and 
its behaviour); 
• Combat agency and operational Information: pertaining to the control agency’s 
operational needs (e.g., personnel involved, catering requirements); 
• Community information needs: details included in the incident information plan, such 
as meetings planned, distribution deadlines for newsletters; 
• Community needs: demographic profile; emergency relief centres, recovery centres, 
requirements for habitation, road closures, warnings, alternative arrangements in, e.g. 
school transportation system; 
• Health-related needs: such as smoke concentration, plume modelling, livestock losses. 
 
In Phase Two of the research, 13 agencies were invited to review the collated information 
needs and to identify what was important for that partner. To date, 10 agencies have 
responded (Municipalities, Vic Police, DHS, DPI, Telstra, Melbourne Water, ABC, Victoria 
Tourism, Parks Victoria, and electricity companies) and their results are collated in 
Attachment 13. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly all agencies that have responded to date have identified the need to 
understand the nature of the event (emergency information) as well as the strategies in place 
to manage it. In terms of the operational needs of the combat agency, all agencies 
responding to date wanted to know about road closures and road access. Community 
information needs and health-related needs were more specific and localised (e.g., of interest 
to municipalities and DHS respectively). However, most agencies nominated wanting to have 
information on the community’s information needs. All details are reported in Attachment 13.  
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Table 5: Agencies’ information needs 
 
INFORMATION NEEDS DEFINITIONS/EXAMPLES Requested by all 
agencies 
   
Emergency information Information that is critical to the management of resources 
during a major, multi-agency emergency (i.e. dynamic changes in the following). 
 
Controlling agency The agency that is in control/lead of the emergency at any 
given time (e.g. under CFA direction). 
* 
Emergency 
management  
system 
Contact detail with management structure of individual 
agencies. The control/recovery structure of the incident. 
* 
Weather Information relating to weather behaviour including that 
information that is provided by agencies such as the Bureau of 
Meteorology and mobile weather stations established in 
response to a particular emergency (e.g. forecasted humidity, 
wind changes, cold fronts, etc). 
 
Fire prediction & fire 
behaviour  
Information relating to the likely behaviour of the fire (e.g. 
expect doubling of scale of outbreak by 1700 hours). 
Information relating to the behaviour of the fire such as extent 
of fire, fire prevention and control activities, etc (e.g. fire 
perimeter changes). 
* 
 Situation reports Information relating to the current situation of the fire including 
weather and  any emergency related communication, impact, 
recovery and rehabilitation plans (e.g. establishing a back burn 
of 5km in length before 1600 hours). 
* 
Mapping Information of a geospatial nature that impacts on the 
management of resources.  Includes such things as extent of 
emergency, fire breaks, road closures, plume modelling, etc 
(e.g. show on a map the local history of fuel reduction burns 
that have occurred). 
 
Readiness & response 
pre-emergency plans 
Any pre-prepared plans that impact on the management of 
resource once an emergency commences (e.g. Municipal Fire 
Management Plan, etc). 
 
Infrastructure assets 
at risk 
Information that provides a detailed account of structures at 
risk (e.g. hospitals, prisons, houses, holiday homes)   
* 
Assets at risk Information that outlines the various strategies that are 
developed in response to the emergency, key and risk 
exposures should the incident behave in a particular manner 
(e.g. if the fire is to head in a north-west direction then a fire 
break needs to be established along Smith Road, etc).This 
includes Incident Action Plans (1–3 days out) and Strategic 
Plans (3–7 days out) detailing plans of attack, roads/bridges to 
be used, environmental (natural/human built)/ heritage assets 
at risk. 
 
Emergency 
management changes 
Information relating to the emergency controlling authority and 
any changes to this during the course of the emergency (e.g. 
the fire was initially under the direction of DSE but is currently 
under the direction of CFA). 
* 
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INFORMATION NEEDS DEFINITIONS/EXAMPLES Requested by all 
agencies 
   
Single agency 
emergencies 
Information that outlines all the current emergencies that 
individual agencies are attending at any given time (e.g. the 
CFA currently has 12 emergencies under its direction). 
 
Combat agency – Operational  
Competing resource 
priorities 
Information that identifies all current emergencies and therefore the 
resources that are being utilised at these various emergencies (e.g. 
there are 40 personnel currently working on the Heyfield fire, etc). 
 
Resourcing needs Information that outlines the needs of the combat/recovery agency.  
This includes the setting up of the staging areas, bulldozers, 
appliances, water tankers and communications. 
 
Personnel Information that provides the location and number of personnel 
involved directly in fire-fighting.   
 
Catering requirements Information that covers meal break times, the number of meals 
required and any special dietary requirements. 
 
Road closures/access Information that provides agencies with locations of road/bridge 
closure/access and weight limitations of those roads/bridges. This 
information also includes traffic management points limiting access to 
unauthorised individuals. 
* 
Community information needs  
Community meetings The locations and times of the meetings. Which personnel will be at 
the meetings (e.g. IC, Community Liaison Officer, Police) 
 
Newsletters Information that needs to be disseminated to the community - allowing 
time for printing and distribution. 
 
Community needs 
Evacuation/Assembly 
points 
Information that provides the locations of evacuation/assembly points 
for the community.  This should also include the re-location of 
hospitals and prisons.  
 
Dwelling losses/damage Information that provides a detailed account of structural 
damage/loss.  This information covers the number of houses, 
caravans, holiday homes, sheds, garages that are damaged and/or 
lost, and the extent of damage.   
 
Requirements for 
habitation 
Information that reports on the provisions required to enable a 
community to function adequately in an emergency (e.g. generators, 
water, pumps). 
 
Demographic profile Demographic information on the diverse population (e.g. culture, aged 
care, special needs). 
 
Health related needs  
Smoke impact / Ember 
attack 
Information that provides detailed readings of air pollution, visibility 
and smoke plume modelling. This also includes weather modelling 
that indicates what locations may be impacted (weather direction), 
smoke dispersal information and height of inversions (key smoke 
concentration elevations). 
 
Livestock  Information that relates to livestock loss and the disposal of the live 
stock (e.g. type of livestock, location and numbers) 
 
 
*Denotes information required by all agencies 
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As discussed previously, it is important for all partners to have clarity about role-specific 
information and to know which agency is responsible for its provision. It is also important to be 
clear about where expertise is available and to have clear expectations about role boundaries 
and responsibilities between partner agencies. Development of a mutually accessible 
database for emergency partner organisations, such as that suggested in the international 
literature review, may warrant further investigation.  
 
It is equally important that no attempt is made to centralise public messaging. Agencies need 
to be able to speak about their own role responsibilities and their assessments based on their 
expertise. This is important at times of limited resources and when an event is escalating. 
 
It was interesting to note that in the London bombings it was important that the agencies 
responsible for delivering specific services were able to publicly speak about what they were 
dealing with. The importance of public comment within the boundaries of an agencies role 
responsibility enables services to communicate in a way that does not send mixed messages.  
 
5.1 Satisfaction with information flow by emergency management 
partner organisations 
As part of the consultation, emergency management partner organisations were also asked to 
comment on their levels of satisfaction with  
• whether information needs are currently being met; 
• the modality currently used to disseminate information; 
• the timeliness of information received; and 
• the relevance of information received. 
 
It can be seen from Attachment 14 that overall there is general satisfaction with the 
information provided, although there are some areas in need of improvement, particularly with 
the DHS. These issues pertained largely to the kind of information the DHS needs to support 
its Rapid Assessment Teams. While emergency management partner organisations were 
satisfied in general that their needs were being met and that the information provided was 
relevant, timeliness was still an issue. Dissatisfaction with the timeliness of the information 
received appears to be an issue for most of the agencies consulted. 
 
Included in Attachment 14 are suggestions from relevant agencies for improvement to meet 
their particular needs. Given the complexity of information needs and the specific nature of 
those needs, the following section will map information flow for particular types of information 
need scenarios.  Before doing so, it is important to gain an overall picture of the various 
emergency management partner organisations and their relationships to one another. 
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6 Modelling information flows 
 
Given the complexity involved in the variety of agencies, their responsibilities and their 
diversity of roles in an emergency services context, the difficulty of attempting to model 
information flows should come as no surprise. The following section will provide a schematic 
outline only of information flows between partner agencies. To appreciate the various 
complexities, particularly in coordination and collaboration required for inter-operability, it is 
worth giving some attention to the variety of possible boundaries that need to be crossed to 
provide effective inter-agency incident management. Table 6 provides a summary of some of 
the main partner agencies and their administrative divisions.  
 
Table 6: Selected Fire and Emergency Service Partner Agency Boundaries 
 
Agency Administrative boundaries 
DSE 5 regions 22 Districts 
CFA 9 areas 20 regions 
DHS 8 regions 
Parks Vic 5 regions 
Local Govt Municipalities 86 municipalities 
Vic Roads 7 regions 
Vic Pol  5 regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Administrative boundaries of DSE, local municipalities and Parks Vic 
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In addition, there are other utilities involved, for example gas, electricity, water, 
telecommunications. In the case of gas there are 25 entities involved (8 in transmission, 3 in 
distribution and the remainder retail or production/storage). To add more complexity, none of 
the geographical administrative boundaries of various agencies even overlap. Figure 6 
highlights the complexity by mapping the administrative, geographical regions of some of the 
agencies listed in Table 6 (DSE, local municipalities and Parks Victoria). Given that, in 
addition to geographical boundaries, there are added functional, technological and cultural 
boundaries, it is little wonder that achieving integrated service delivery requires considerable 
effort. 
 
In this section then only a brief functional schema will be attempted. In order to address the 
various levels of information flow needed within the relevant agencies, as well as the inter-
dependencies between those agencies involved, a template was developed to provide a 
means of mapping those relationships.  Table 7 begins to differentiate some of the aspects 
that need to be taken into consideration.  
 
On the one hand, there is a need to differentiate between fire control functions, coordination 
and support functions and the linkages needed between those layers of activity. The activity 
occurring within and between these layers and functions also needs to convey information to 
emergency management partner organisations who have involvement in management or 
resourcing aspects of the fire-related event, as well as to members of different communities.  
 
 
Table 7: Template for mapping information flows. 
 
 
Level 
 
General community 
 
Fire control 
responsibility 
Emergency 
management 
arrangements 
(EMMV) 
Emergency 
management 
partners 
 
 
State 
 
 
General public 
 
State (e.g. 
ECC/SECC 
 
 
SERCC 
 
 
ECC 
 
Regional 
 
Affected health/tourism 
 
(IFACC/RECC) 
 
 
DECC 
 
REOC 
 
Local 
 
Direct impact (before, 
during, after) 
 
Local (ICC) 
 
 
MECC 
 
 
 
 
In the first column Table 7 shows the levels of focus (local, regional, state).  In terms of the 
general public, the local community will be those members who are directly affected, before, 
during and after a fire-related event. At a regional level there may be members of the public 
who need to be aware of smoke concentrations and need to be prepared to activate their own 
fire plans, should the fire move in their direction. There are going to be holiday-makers 
interested in both the fire-affected local areas, as well as the potentially fire-affected region. In 
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addition, there are business operators who have information needs in terms of the real and 
potential impacts on their business of a fire in the vicinity (e.g., tourist operators, beekeepers, 
wine-makers). At a state level there is general community interest. Within the general 
community there may be concerned families needing information on their lived ones involved 
in a fire impact. Given the importance of information flow to the communities, it is discussed in 
a separate chapter later in this report. 
 
The fire control structure also operates at state, regional and local levels. The state level 
(ECC) will be on stand-by on high fire-danger days, even before an event commences in a 
locality. When a fire commences, there will be a local response involving fire-fighting on the 
fire-ground.  In the initial phase the Incident Controller will perform all functions of an IMT.  If 
the complexity of the fire is beyond a Level One, an Incident control Centre (ICC) will be 
established, with support from the regional level and the ECC.  When there are multiple fires 
requiring multiple ICC and the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre (RECC) has 
exceeded its capacity, the Regional Duty Officer (RDO) will establish an Integrated Fire 
Agency Co-ordination Centre (IFACC) to be established to coordinate between the multiple 
ICCs. Within the Coordination and Support functions of emergency management, there is a 
continuum of emergency management partnership. Some agencies will be heavily involved 
because of their designated roles and responsibilities (see section 4) others only when their 
particular infrastructure or organisational interests are impacted. 
 
In the responsibilities outlined in the EMMV, when necessary, a MECC will be established; 
and if necessary, a regional equivalent, a Divisional Emergency Co-ordination centre. At a 
state level, should a state of emergency be declared, the State Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre acts at the interface of coordination and support agencies and the 
political sphere as does the ECC. 
6.1 Mapping information flow within and between elements in the 
incident management system 
Figure 7 shows the different areas of responsibility (fire control, coordination and support) as 
well as specialised emergency management partner interests. As can be seen from the 
figure, the differing lenses illustrate information flow with that component of agencies involved 
in the emergency management arrangements. The Figure also illustrates the ways in which 
these arrangements are nested and overlapping. The following section discusses these 
interdependencies.  
 
Information flow from the fire control agency functions to the community are discussed in 
section 7. Figure 8 maps how information gets to and from the information unit (the unit 
responsible for information flow) to emergency management partner organisations and the 
community, according to how it is described in the Information Unit guidelines.  
 
Figure 9 provides a picture of the linkages between the fire control agency activities (and their 
respective regional and state levels of fire-related coordination). Figure 10 maps how 
information flows between fire control agencies, emergency management partner 
organisations. It will do so by working through the information flow arrangements needed in 
four different scenarios.  
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Figure 7: Mapping emergency management relationships in fire-related events 
 
 
 
Partners in 
emergency services  
EMMV Coordination 
arrangements 
State 
Regional 
Local 
Fire 
control/coordination 
See Figure 8  
 
See Figures 
9,10 11, 12 
See Figure 8  
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6.1.1 Mapping information flow in fire control at the local level 
This section first maps the way in which information flows through the fire control  agency 
responsible at the local level according to the Information Unit guidelines, since it is the 
Information Unit that is responsible for information flow to Emergency Management Partner 
Organisations. Figure 8 represents the information flow into, within and out of the Information 
Unit within the Planning Section in an IMT during an incident.1 The figure shows that the 
Information Officer receives information from a number of sources. Information is obtained 
from the incident itself via the Operations Section, the Resources and Situation Units in the 
Planning Section and a variety of supporting and variously affected partners, such as the 
local, regional and general community, local governments, police, ambulance, utilities and 
infrastructure managers. 
 
An Information Officer is required to gather and disseminate information within an IMT to and 
from other DSE Coordination Centres, to/from the community, to/from the media and to/from 
other relevant organisations, such as the CFA. The duties ‘normally undertaken’ by the 
Information Officer and indicated in Figure 8 are: 
• Liaise with the Planning Officer (and other Information Unit members), Incident 
Controller and Situation Officers to obtain the latest incident information. This 
information consists of: 
o Name of fire 
o Location of fire 
o Size of fire 
o Assets under threat and impacted by fire (including towns, farms, bridges, 
infrastructures, people parks, stock, plantations, historic and cultural heritage, 
endangered species, houses, forest, wildlife) 
o When and how the fire started 
o Weather conditions and forecast 
o Agencies involved and resources committed 
o Strategies in place to control the fire 
o Other points of interest (if time permits) such as the use of specialist equipment, 
technical specialists, fire history of the area, fire ecology and the adaptability of 
plants and animals and the importance of fire in the natural environment. 
• Based on the information received, the Information Officer is responsible for the 
creation and implementation of an incident information plan (IIP) and the 
compilation, synthesis and construction of information to be released to the various 
partner organisations. An IIP identifies ‘which planned dissemination tools can be 
usefully deployed during the incident, and what critical messages need to be carried to 
the public in the threat area’ (Information Unit Workbook 06/07, p. 9). An IIP should 
contain the following information: 
o Incident name 
o Date/Time/Shift 
o Information Officer name 
o Information Unit Staff, contact details and shift times 
o Situation summary 
o Information Unit objective 
o Information Unit strategies and tactics (what, who, how, by when and where) 
o Critical issues (warnings and alerts) 
 
• Obtain authorisation from the Incident Controller to enact IIP 
                                                     
1
 For a Level 2 incident developing into a Level 3 incident. 
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• Distribute the IIP to the Planning Officer and the ECC Information Unit. 
• If deemed necessary, the roles of Media Liaison Officer (MLO) and Community Liaison 
Officer (CLO) may be created to disseminate information to their respective audiences; 
the media and community. 
 
Both the IIP and media releases are conveyed by the Planning Officer to the Incident 
Controller for the purposes of informing as well as authorising for release. The approved IIP is 
then returned to the Information Unit for implementation, which is monitored by the 
Information Officer who in turn advises the Planning Officer of the IIP’s progress. Meanwhile, 
information is disseminated to the various stakeholders via a combination of the following 
Information Unit roles (as outlined in the Guidelines, 2007): Media Liaison Officer, Community 
Liaison Officer and Community Meeting Presenter. 
 
Figure 7 highlights one of the information risks identified previously, in that there is no 
designated function that has responsibility for conveying information to the emergency 
management partner organisations represented in the Municipal Emergency Coordination 
Centre (MECC).  
 
It is clear from reading the document that the intent of the IIP is for an internal readership and 
appears to be one for logging purposes. The IIP could become a more strategic dissemination 
tool with further development. Parts of the IIP could reflect different stages of the emergency 
that is sent to partner organisations providing information on strategies that are being 
enacted. It could include high priority critical targets as well as key messages for partner 
organisations. 
 
The IIP is the vehicle used to obtain authorisation for information release. Given the earlier 
discussion about the difficulty of delivering timely messages and the various layers of 
authorisation required within the command and control structure for certain types of 
information, it may be possible to develop a protocol where the release of information is pre-
approved, provided there is no substantial addition of new content. For example, the release 
of information authorised by an IC within an IMT to be distributed to external sources 
immediately and concurrently sent to regional and state levels of control agency for their 
information. 
 
It is also interesting to note that there does not appear to be a strong relationship between the 
Situation Unit and the Information Unit in pooling and making meaning out of information 
gathered. Strengthening the role of the Situation Unit in being a key source of information for 
dissemination would enhance information flow within the IMT and enhance timeliness of 
delivery. 
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Figure 8: Information flow within the Information Unit and the rest of the IMT 
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 29 of 67 
 
6.1.2 Information flow between control, coordination & emergency partner 
organisations 
Figure 9 illustrates the interconnections between the fire control functions (at local, regional 
and state level) and the MECC, as described by the interviewees. The IMT is included in the 
locality of the MECC and interfaces with it. The IFACC is also likely to be sending and 
receiving information from the MECC. 
 
The MECC is identified as the coordination centre for locally based emergency management 
partner organisations involved in assisting the response agencies with resources in the 
response phase. The role of the MECC is also to facilitate communication about the support 
and services to be provided to the community, provide needed welfare support as well as 
provide oversight and responsibility for the recovery activities. The dotted lines around the 
community represent the permeability of this boundary. The information flow to the community 
from the IMT is discussed later in section 7. 
 
According to the EMMV, the MECC is chaired by the Municipal Emergency Response Officer 
(MERO), who is a member of the Victorian Police, and supported by a Municipal Emergency 
Resource Coordinator (MERC) from the local municipal council. The MECC is where utilities, 
government agencies, local government and others are able to liaise and coordinate their 
individual and collective efforts. The interconnection between these partners and their own 
organisations is outlined in Figure 9. 
 
It was difficult to place the NEO agencies (e.g., DPI) who have other roles and 
responsibilities, such as managing the response to livestock losses. 
 
According to the interviews, when the MECC is not in operation all emergency management 
partners with an interest need to create a relationship with the Incident Controller given that 
the IMT has responsibility for the fire control functions. The MECC represents a critical tool for 
coordinating a variety of emergency management partners’ interests. Figure 10 maps the flow 
of information from the fire control  agencies, the MECC and other levels of coordination and 
support, as well as other partner organisations. 
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Figure 9: Information flow between the Incident Management System and the MECC 
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6.1.3 Information flow between control, coordination and emergency 
management partner organisations 
The respective inter-connections between the various layers of fire control (and its internal 
command systems); emergency management coordination and support as designated in the 
EMMV, and the liaison needed with other emergency management partner organisations are 
mapped in this next section. Figure 10, following, shows the flow of information from the 
location of the incident vertically through the Fire Control agency and horizontally to the local 
level of the Emergency Management Coordination and Support arrangements. 
 
The figure shows how some levels of coordination are not always activated, as represented 
by the dashed lines. Thus, if an incident is local and has not escalated and is straight forward, 
there may be communication between the local (ICC) and the state (ECC) level only. If 
resources beyond control agency capacity (i.e. employed, contracted or registered volunteer) 
are required, and if at a local level the event becomes more complex, the MECC is 
established. As discussed, gearing up this point of coordination for partners with emergency 
services roles and responsibilities is critical. The other points of coordination in the 
information flow represented with dashed lines (IFACC, DECC) indicate that those 
coordination structures are not always in place. In most circumstances, however, it is 
reasonable to expect that there will be coordination with other external partners and 
communication through a (MECC). 
 
It is expected that there will always be some communication needed with NEO internal 
partner organisations as well as a need to manage the information flow upwards to the 
political sphere. 
 
In this figure some of the arrows are two-way to illustrate how information can flow throughout 
the system. However, in the particular scenarios following, arrows will be used to indicate the 
direction of information flow based in the scenario being discussed. 
 
A critical issue not represented is how the fire control function manages to service multiple 
MECCs when these are established, such as was the case in the Grampians fires of 2005. 
Issues for consideration include the relationships between the ICC and the IFACC on the one 
hand, and the MECC and the DECC on the other. At present this areas has not been 
articulated in any of the documentation reviewed and was not raised in the interviews. One 
possibility in the case of escalation of multiple fires and events may be to activate IFACC and 
DECC levels of coordination as soon as possible. It is also worth considering whether, at this 
level, centres of coordination may be co-located. 
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Figure 10: Information flow between Control, EMMV emergency management arrangements and 
emergency management partners. 
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6.2 Mapping information flow through the system 
The types of information needing to flow from fire control agency functions to coordination and 
support and to other emergency management partner organisations will vary depending on 
the nature of the event that requires attention. In this next section this is illustrated through 
four possible scenarios in a fire-related event. The scenarios include the need to: 
• activate a road closure (or traffic management point) 
• manage the threat to power-lines 
• relocate a human services facility (hospital/aged care) 
• provide emergency relief 
 
The first scenario is based on the Guidelines for the Operation of Traffic Management Points 
During Wildfires. There are no such guidelines for the other two scenarios. Consequently, the two 
maps for those scenarios are developed from interviews with, and feedback from, a number of 
experienced practitioners. The maps included here have been reviewed by key partner 
representatives for validation.  
6.2.1 Information flow to activate a road closure  
To distinguish between a full road closure and a partial road closure, according to the Guidelines 
for the Operation of Traffic Management Points During Wildfires,* the Victoria Police (VicPol), 
Country Fire Authority (CFA) and the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) all 
have the authority to establish and operate a Traffic Management Point (TMP) with the caveat 
that, Nothing in these Guidelines limits or derogates from the independent discretion that is 
available to police officers in the exercise of their duties and functions. (General Principles 1.7). 
A Victorian Coroner has made a ruling that Victoria Police have powers at a bushfire under 
s.31(3)(a) of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to stop people from travelling past a traffic 
management point regardless of whether they wish to travel to a place where they have a 
pecuniary interest or not. CFA and DSE also have this power. (General Principles 1.6) 
 
Some examples of specified individuals or groups that may be authorised by the Incident 
Controller to pass a partial road closure at a TMP include (but are not limited to) (General 
Principle 2.2.2): 
• Participating emergency service personnel travelling by car; 
• utility providers; 
• persons on private fire-fighting equipment; 
• media personnel; 
• people with a pecuniary interest. 
Fire control agency information flow 
All of the individuals or groups named in the above examples (and others unnamed but 
suggested in the caveat ‘but … not limited to’), which have historically demonstrated a need to 
gain access beyond a road closure, would have information requirements concerning the location 
and status of a road closure to assist in the development of their own contingency plans. It would 
assist any agency requiring authorisation from the Incident Controller to be aware of that 
requirement prior to arrival at the road closure. Equally, any agency that would not gain 
authorisation to pass the road closure should be able to establish that before arriving at the road 
closure point. 
 
                                                     
*All text in italics is directly quoted from the Guidelines for the Operation of Traffic Management Points 
During Wildfires; a joint document produced by and for the Victoria Police, Country Fire Authority and 
the Department of Sustainability and Environment.  
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Figure 11, page 36, shows the information flow resulting from the establishment of two types of 
TMPs. TMP 1 is established by an Incident Controller (CFA or DSE) and TMP 2 is established by 
Victoria Police. 
 
The figure shows that if an Incident Controller from either the CFA or DSE initiates a TMP (TMP 
1) that the Incident Controller is then required to pass all the information about TMPs required 
under these Guidelines as expeditiously as possible to (General Principle 2.3): 
• In the case of Victoria Police the Police Operations Centre, or in the event, a Police 
Operation Centre has not been established, Police Communications; 
• in the case of CFA or DSE, to personnel in the Incident Management System who require 
the information. 
 
If Victoria Police initiates a TMP (TMP 2), the decision must be communicated to the Incident 
Controller as soon as possible and the TMP will be a Full Road Closure unless the TMP is varied 
by the Incident Controller (General Principle 3.5). If the Incident Controller subsequently changes 
any of the conditions of a TMP during the operational period of a TMP, the Incident Controller 
must immediately advise Police Operation Centre/Police Communications (as applicable) of all of 
the relevant details (General Principle 4.2.1). 
 
The Guidelines state that when information is passed from the Incident Controller to either the 
Police Operations Centre or Police Communications (as applicable) Victoria Police must confirm 
the information so passed (General Principle 4.3.1). And, whenever the Police Operation 
Centre/Police Communications (as applicable), passes information from the Incident Controller to 
Victoria Police TMP staff, that TMP staff person must confirm the information so passed (General 
Principle 4.3.2). 
 
The Guidelines indicate that the Incident Controller has responsibility for deciding and managing 
the location and status of a Partial Road Closure at a TMP (General Principle 3.2), while Victoria 
Police will operate all TMPs. Victoria Police may request the State Emergency Service to assist in 
the operation of road closures (General Principle 3.3).  
Information flow to emergency management partners 
The Guidelines place the responsibility for notifying either the Municipal Emergency Coordination 
Centre (MECC), or in the absence of a MECC, the VicRoads Traffic Management Centre, of 
road closures/openings, and that this communication will take place by telephone (General 
Principle 6.1) 
 
The red dashed line indicates the contingent flow of information in the circumstance that the first 
options are unavailable. If, for instance, the MECC has not been established, then the Incident 
Controller is required to forward the relevant information to the VicRoads Traffic Management 
Centre. In addition, if the Police Operations Centre has not been established, then both the 
Incident Controller and the responsible officer from Victoria Police are required to forward the 
relevant information directly to Police Communications. From reading the current Guidelines, it is 
not known how relevant information is conveyed to emergency management partners, particularly 
if a MECC is not in place. 
 
Figure 12, page 37, shows the flow of information from the location of the incident vertically 
through the Fire control agency and horizontally to the local level of the Coordination and Support 
arrangements. Each of the agencies which are represented in the Municipal Emergency 
Coordination Centre then passes that information through to their own coordination points. The 
information flow between the ICC and the Police, as well as with the MECC is two-way, 
illustrating the close collaboration and cooperation required. 
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6.2.2 Information flow to manage the threat to power-lines 
Figure 13, page 38, shows the flow of information as a consequence of the requirement for 
powerlines under threat due to an actual and/or potential bushfire threat during a level 2 or 3 
incident when a MECC is in place. The figure shows the flow of information from the location of 
the incident vertically through the fire control agency and horizontally to the local level of the 
Coordination and Support arrangements. Each of the agencies which are represented in the 
Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre then passes that information up via their own 
coordination arrangements. 
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Figure 11: Information flow request to establish road closure (Source: Guidelines for the 
Operation of Traffic Management Points during Wildfires).   
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Figure 12: Information flow for road closure. 
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Figure 13: Information flow for a bushfire threat to power-lines. 
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Figure 14: The flow of information for a human services facility relocation. 
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6.2.3 Information flow for facility relocation 
Similar to Figure 13, Figure 14 (relating to human services facility relocation), on the previous 
page shows the flow of information from the location of the incident vertically through the fire 
control agency and horizontally to the local level of the Coordination and Support. Each of the 
agencies represented in the Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre then passes that 
information up through their own Emergency Coordination and Support/ Emergency Services 
Liaison coordination levels. The use of two-ended arrows indicates that information flows in 
both directions. 
 
The DHS is the agency with responsibility for human services facility relocation. Information, 
which is provided to the DHS by the ICC, is provided to the MECC and can take two forms: 
1. Specific information concerning the spread of the bushfire that the IMT has 
determined will have an impact on specific facilities. 
2. Generic information concerning the spread of the bushfire that the DHS has 
determined will have an impact on specific facilities. 
 
The MECC provides an opportunity for partner agencies to collaboratively make decisions 
and keep each other informed of their capabilities in assisting the DHS to relocate their 
facilities (for example, information concerning TMPs and power outages). 
 
Having received the information, the DHS ESLO then disseminates that information to their 
agency REOC. The agencies involved then communicate their needs to each other at the 
regional level of coordination. The DHS REOC is the level of coordination with the 
responsibility of coordinating the relocation effort. 
6.2.4 Information flow for the provision of emergency relief  
There are a number of interrelated and overlapping issues which make problematic the 
mapping of the information flow relating to the need to assist people to access an emergency 
relief centre, in particular during fire impact. These issues include: 
• The number of ways in which the need for emergency relief comes to the notice of the 
responsible authorities. 
o People arrive under their own volition at locations which have been 
predesignated in Municipal Fire Plans as emergency relief points. 
o Having not left earlier, people self-evacuate during fire impact to either an 
Incident Control Centre or a Traffic Management Point 
o The responsible authorities in the ICC, determine that some people may be 
required to relocate due to fire behaviour and forward that information to the 
MERO and/or MERC. 
o The municipal authorities determine from information provided by the ICC that 
people will be required to be relocated. 
• The scale and nature of the MECC is dynamic, and contingent on a number of 
factors, and may take a variety of forms. 
o The MECC may at certain times, such as in a low threat or early phase of a 
bushfire, be a MERO and MERC, operating together in a ‘virtual’ MECC where 
other partners are contacted and coordinated off site by a variety of 
communication modalities (e.g. telephone, fax and email). 
o MECCs are located, resourced and staffed with personnel available to the 
municipal authorities and agencies in accordance with the principle of variable 
availability. 
o Span of control issues relating to the escalation and de-escalation of the MECC 
are not articulated in documentation. 
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• There are currently no predetermined criteria that the authors could locate for how the 
need will be met. 
o In some circumstances the municipal authorities will pass the requirement to 
other agencies in order to save their own financial and human resources. 
o Some municipal authorities have Memoranda Of Understanding with partner 
agencies while others do not. 
 
The two following figures describe the information flow requirements in the case of two 
different scenarios. 
 
Figure 15, page 42, shows the information flow in the event of people requiring food and 
shelter in an emergency relief centre in the circumstance where a MECC has been 
established and the municipal authorities have assumed primary responsibility for the 
provision of emergency relief for people in their municipality. This is undertaken in 
consultation with partners in emergency services organisations such as the DHS, Red Cross 
and Salvation Army. The Red Cross collect and collate personal information of the people 
relocated and then make that information available at the Red Cross State Inquiry Centre. 
 
Figure 16, page 43, shows the flow of information when the MECC is established and the 
responsibility for the provision of emergency shelter is primarily assumed by agencies, such 
as the Red Cross, Salvation Army and St Vincent de Paul. The Red Cross collects and 
collates personal details of those affected and makes that information available from the Red 
Cross State Inquiry Centre. These agencies communicate with each other and coordinate 
their activities at the regional level via their Regional Emergency Operations Centres (REOC).
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Figure 15: Information flow for self-evacuees’ food and shelter needs via municipal authorities  
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Figure 16: Information flow for self-evacuees’ food and shelter needs via partners in emergency 
services. 
ICC 
MECC 
(See Fig. 8) 
Salvation 
Army 
Incident 
Management 
System 
ESLO 
 
St Vincent 
De Paul 
Regional level of 
coordination and 
support system 
REOC 
DHS 
ESLO 
Incident 
Management 
System 
State level of 
coordination and 
support system 
State 
Regional 
Local 
Legend 
Fire Control/ 
Coordination 
Centres 
Partners in 
Emergency 
Services 
Emergency 
Coordination and 
Support Centres 
(not always 
activated) 
Communication 
between 
coordinating 
centres 
Communication 
between centres 
(not always 
activated) 
First priority 
communication 
 
Communication 
between 
Emergency 
Services 
Fire 
Control/Coordinatio
n 
Partners in Emergency 
Services (Stakeholders) 
Information for 
inquiry data base 
 
Red 
Cross 
Red Cross 
State Inquiry 
Centre 
Emergency Management 
Arrangements (EMMV) 
MERC MERO MRM 
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 44 of 67 
 
7 Mapping different information flow to support communities 
 
This section illustrates the ways in which information flows to the community from the fire 
control agencies. As was discussed in Table 3, there are different layers of geographic 
communities that will have different information needs. It is also recognised that these 
communities comprise a diverse range of interests, identities and dispositions. These can 
include ethnic, aged, homebound, Indigenous, and deaf communities, to name but a few. It is 
outside the scope of this report to address differing communities and their information needs, 
and so the focus here will remain simply at the location of a community in relation to the 
impact of the fire.  
 
There needs to be collaboration between emergency management partner organisations 
(such as the DHS and municipalities) in relation to how particular types of communities in 
various locations might best be targeted if the MECC is not activated. It may also be worthy of 
suggesting that, in a response phase, fire control agencies might delegate responsibility for 
targeting particular community types differing communities within the geographic area to the 
MECC. The rationale for this is that such coordinating mechanisms have a range of local 
expertise available (e.g. municipal community workers and local representatives from DHS). 
 
Table 8: Elements of community and their information needs. 
 
COMMUNITY 
LAYER 
INFORMATION NEEDS 
 
LOCAL 
Direct imminent 
or likely impact 
(future) 
 
Information about the level of threat 
Warning of fast moving fire 
Local owner response plans & preparation 
Information to assist with decision to stay or go 
Community safe locations 
LOCAL 
Direct fire 
impacted (past) 
Information about the availability of resources including government 
assistance, infrastructure 
 
REGIONAL 
Indirect Impact 
(tourism, family 
relationships) 
Road blocks/road closure 
Likely direction of the fire front 
Information to assist with decision to stay or go 
STATE  
General public 
of Victoria 
 
Location of fire 
Likely direction of fire front 
Level of threat to the regions impacted 
Road blocks/road closure 
Key infrastructure at risk 
 
 
Table 8 summarises the geographic communities and their information needs relevant to a 
fire-related emergency event. The table illustrates the kind of information strategies that the 
Information Officer in the Incident Information Plan will address, using the variety of 
dissemination tools discussed in detail in the Information Unit Guidelines. Of interest here are 
the differing modalities that might be employed and the levels of authorisation needed to do 
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so. Figure 17 below illustrates the different community audiences and the communication 
modalities typically in use at different geographic levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Levels of community and communication modalities. 
 
 
In the case of communities directly experiencing the threat or impact of fire, as the Information 
Unit Guidelines propose, face-to-face and multiple methods of information delivery are going 
to be more appropriate. During 2007 considerable development occurred in creating 
templates through the joint DSE/CFA Information Unit Project to support these varied 
communication modalities.  
 
There is also a tacit assumption (i.e., the authors of this report have not yet found roles and 
responsibilities explicitly discussed) that different communication modalities are managed by 
different levels of organisation within the incident management system. It makes sense to 
delineate different communication functions to different levels of organisation, provided this 
streamlines information flow processes and does not create additional bottlenecks. 
 
It is suggested that the roles and responsibilities at different Information Unit levels (at IMT, 
IFACC and ECC) need to be better differentiated to avoid duplication and to streamline 
service delivery and non-operational intelligence gathering. The level of organisation that 
appears most under-developed and in greatest need of integration is at the regional level, or 
at the IFACC when one is activated. 
 
The level of organisation that appears most under-developed and in greatest need of 
integration is at the regional (IFACC) level, when one is activated. It is currently problematic, 
under certain conditions, that information needs to pass through the IFACC or even through 
the ECC before certain types of information can be publicly displayed. The discussion earlier 
about pre-approved release of certain types of information under certain conditions is worthy 
of consideration. 
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Figure 18: Differing communication modalities managed at local, regional and state Information 
Unit levels. 
 
 
In campaign fires, the local, regional and state levels operating within fire control agencies are 
well established and changes can be reasonably anticipated and thus managed. The 
challenge is when these conditions are not established, either because integration between 
local, regional and state levels are not functioning effectively or because there has not been 
time to set them up properly.   
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7.1 Risks to timely information flow to support communities 
 
Table 9 below summarises the potential risks in information blockages that can occur at the 
various levels within the Information Unit functions in the fire control structure. 
 
Table 9: Community communication strategies at local, regional and state levels, and 
areas of risk of information blockage. 
 
LEVEL Level in fire 
control 
agency 
Communication 
modalities 
 
Potential risks to timely information 
flow/blockages 
STATE ECC VBIL; Internet; 
state-wide media – 
radio, TV, 
newspapers 
 
 
- Information about threats/loss incomplete  
- Information delays in transmittal to outlets 
(VBIL; Internet) 
- Not all maps are appropriate for dial up 
connection 
REGION District Office or 
IFACC if 
activated 
 
Written media 
releases  
 
 
- Changes to information does not reflect 
local situation;  
- Delays in information being fed up to ECC 
LOCAL IMT: IC and IU Newsletters; 
community 
meetings;  
IC authorised radio 
broadcasts 
 
 
- IC becomes overloaded;  
- ICC not committed to information 
management 
- Connections between situation and 
information units weak 
- Information unit not adequately resourced 
- Information not conveyed appropriately at 
meetings; 
- Community meeting attendance is not 
comprehensive 
- Disconnect MECC/DERC delays in SEWS  
LOCAL 
FIRE-
GROUND 
Divisions/ 
Sectors 
Phone 
Radio 
 
 
- Fire-ground does not inform IMT of its 
situation/strategy;  
- Informal contact with community results in 
contradictory messages 
- Media contact not coordinated through 
appropriate channels 
 
 
 
The table outlines possible risks to timely information flow in providing information to support 
communities. It should be noted that, as one respondent said, even if the system is operating 
as effectively as it possibly can be, if information has to filter through a variety of levels, and 
each time it is being authorised/processed before it can be disseminated, the time frame will 
still be far too long. For example, if information coming in from the fire-ground is processed 
within 15 minutes (arguably an unrealistic ambition) before being progressed through each 
level, it would still take one hour2 before the update appeared on state level information 
dissemination points. It should also be noted that, in part, this reflects the heavy reliance on 
transfer of information through paper-based means. 
                                                     
2
 Fire-ground to IMT; IMT-IFACC; IFACC to ECC; ECC to point of distribution (VBIL; Internet) 
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Under certain circumstances (e.g. a fast-moving fire with high potential to threaten a 
community) a different flow of information to the community may be warranted. Figure 19 
illustrates how, if a going fire escalates rapidly and moves to imminent impact, then the 
Information Unit should have all information methods at its disposal.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Possible information flows to communities under conditions of running fire.  
 
 
An ICC Information Unit is likely to be busy:  
• preparing notification messages for intended audiences, including notifications for the 
VBIL; Internet; as well as local dissemination strategies; 
• preparing radio broadcast opportunities for the Incident Controller/Deputy Incident 
Controller; 
• facilitating connections to the DERC to issue SEWS; 
• arranging community meetings (in conjunction with the MERO/MECC); 
• managing media interest. 
 
Therefore, in facilitating information flow to partner organisations, it would be useful to identify 
where some of the load can be transferred up to the IFACC (if available) so that it can be 
concurrently disseminated to multiple locations at once, rather than needing to flow 
sequentially, through the various layers.  
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7.1.1 Authorisation of information dissemination to communities 
Attempts to address the issues of authorisation and timeliness have been included in the 
updated Information Unit Guidelines. However, in the endeavour to streamline information 
flow to address these bottlenecks others may have been established.  
 
For example, the Guidelines make a distinction between ‘decisional’ and ‘enabling’ activities. 
The ‘decisional’ activities are to be conducted, appropriately we believe, at the local/IMT level. 
The intention of migrating decision-making down to the lowest possible level is a very 
important principle and worthy of full support. However, in doing so it seems that another 
layer of bureaucratic reporting has in fact been added that may hinder timeliness of 
information flow to communities. This is because it seems that any action taken at the 
regional level needs to be first checked off and approved at the ‘decisional’ local level [cf: The 
overseeing Information Officer located at the enabling location, as the workload increases, will 
have to liaise with the Information Officers or Information Unit Leaders at each IMT about the 
escalation requirements of the Unit, p. 21]. This may present some extra decisional layers in 
the system that work against the timely delivery of information flow.  
 
It would be helpful to distinguish where information is sent for information only and where in 
the system information flows need to be authorised.  
 
Attachment 15 provides tables of the type of information required at the various stages of a 
fire-related event, including pre-response; going fire with potential for impact; fire impact on a 
community; post-impact; recovery, based on the information provided by respondents in the 
interviews. The tables provide a synopsis of the issues and risks associated with failure of 
selected aspects of information flow to support communities.  
 
Suggested improvements are discussed in the conclusion. 
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8 Conclusion and areas for improvement 
 
This report has reviewed: 
• what can be learned from inquiries into large-scale multi-agency coordination found in 
the international literature; 
• existing documentation to identify the roles and responsibilities for provision of 
information to emergency management partner organisations; 
• data gathered from consultations with partner organisations about their information 
needs and their satisfaction with the information they receive; 
• information required within and between partner agencies in a fire-related event, and 
mapped the information flows needed. 
 
This section discusses what strategies might help facilitate improvements in information flow 
to continue to develop robust and resilient partnerships needed in a fire-related event. It is 
hoped that the following provide a platform to support the DSE’s ongoing agenda to create a 
situational real-time communication system able to serve the variety of information needs. 
 
8.1 Lessons learned from international incidents 
A number of suggestions arise from the lessons learned from the literature: 
 
Be cautious about lessons learned. An important insight from the review of inquiries into 
major international events was the caution not to take lessons learned too literally. As a 
consequence, of attempting to transfer learning too directly from what could be learned from 
the World Trade Center attacks, where many people were killed with few survivors, 
emergency services in London were unprepared for the scale of injured and traumatised 
victims in the case of the London Underground bombings.  
 
Deploy emerging information technologies where appropriate.  
Developing different kinds of information support systems that may enable disparate agencies 
– geographically dispersed – to build up and maintain situation awareness was identified as 
an important  future agenda. The applicability here for the DSE is to explore the variety of 
information communications technologies and to trial their application in a range of 
information need situations. For example pod-casting the ECC briefings would enable 
emergency management partners to get updates when convenient for the partner. This would 
also allow a larger group to hear directly what is going on rather than having the message 
relayed. 
 
Develop shared databases. Another feature mentioned for attention in the literature involved 
the development of mutual databases that might be shared on a secure extranet facility. This 
could be accessed by partner organisations. In terms of the DSE and emergency partner 
organisation information needs, more work would be needed to ensure the data was in a 
format that was meaningful to the context of the interested parties.  
 
Proactively monitor inaccurate media reporting. An important strategy identified in the 
literature involved being proactive in monitoring, and thus correcting, inaccurate media 
releases. From the research reported here, this is particularly critical in fast-moving situations. 
This type of function could best be served at a state level. At present an overview of the 
media themes is collected on a daily basis. The proposal here would be one of changing the 
emphasis and strategy of this activity. The template used to distribute media releases needs, 
    
Information Mapping Project: Report for the Critical Reference Group (Owen, Hickey & Douglas) page 51 of 67 
if not already undertaken clear time-stamping of media releases which would help minimise 
confusion. 
 
Integrate agency response plans. There was attention in the international inquiries on the 
need for integration of response plans. The DSE and the CFA have already made 
considerable progress in this regard. These advances are also needed with the other 
emergency management partners identified in this report to facilitate coordination in real-time. 
The progress underway in better coordinating planning with emergency management partners 
such as the municipalities and the DHS holds promise if they continue successfully. 
 
Engage liaison personnel in training. The US inquiries in particular noted the importance of 
enhancing inter-operability through better training and resources for communications, 
information and liaison personnel. This needs to occur in both directions. That is, partner 
personnel would benefit from being involved in DSE/CFA IMT training. There was also 
comment made in the interviews with emergency management partners that DSE staff would 
benefit if they took up the invitations to MECC training. In planning training for the next fire 
season, it might be possible to organise joint training and exercising opportunities. 
 
Facilitate leadership development and training. One of the critical breakdowns that occurred 
in both the case of the management of Hurricane Katrina and the SARS outbreak was the 
wilful subversion of system structures, leading to blockages in information flow. It is vitally 
important that ICs, indeed all emergency management personnel, have an understanding of 
the importance of information flow and information management and of the variety of 
stakeholder needs and uses of that information. This is a shift to systems thinking and to 
understanding where the activity is occurring within the broader context of emergency 
management arrangements and information needs. 
 
8.2 Roles and responsibilities 
Reinforce and legitimise the Information Unit. There is a need to continue to reinforce the role 
of the Information Unit in pre-fire season briefings to fire control personnel. This would assist 
in ensuring consistency in expectations and activities. The types of activities expected by an 
Information Unit could be supported by including the role and responsibility of the Information 
Unit in the DSE Code of Practice and reinforcing the role in the Fire Suppression Manual. 
This will assist in standardising the role and function 
 
Include roles and relationships in EMMV. It would also be important for any update of the 
EMMV to reflect the adopted ways of organising fire control agencies in order to clarify 
emergency management arrangements, particularly in terms of information flow to support 
communities. This would provide a platform for better integration at the community and 
emergency management partners level 
 
Facilitate closer linkages between the Information Unit and the MECC. As discussed, there is 
a need to develop more explicit linkage between the Information Unit functions and the roles 
and responsibilities of the MECC, which serves as the prime point of coordination for 
emergency management partner organisations. The practice of having an agency liaison 
officer in the MECC provides a conduit on strategy and incident priority tasks and key risks. 
However, use of the practice has been variable. Strengthening the linkage would strengthen 
the point of coordination. 
 
Consider how information flows in the case of multiple MECCs.  The history of experience 
with the Grampians fires illustrates the difficulties of one ICC attempting to service multiple 
MECCs. 
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Review reporting lines of the Information Unit. As discussed, the role and responsibility of the 
Information Unit continues to grow. There has been discussion about whether the Information 
Unit should be reporting directly to the Incident Controller. Extracting the Information Unit up 
and out of the Planning Section, so that it is directly accountable to the Incident Controller, 
and thus operates as a section in its own right, is worthy of consideration. However, the 
research reported here would suggest this strategy has serious risks associated with it in 
terms of setting up the possibility of parallel information pathways. Strengthening lines of 
communication within the IMT may provide a better improvement in information flow. 
 
Review information flow within the planning section. This is particularly important in order to 
strengthen the relationships between the information gathered and interpreted within the 
situation unit and the information unit. 
 
Review information flow authorisation in periods of escalation. To ensure timely release of 
information, it may be possible for certain types of information under certain conditions to 
develop a protocol where the release of information is pre-approved, provided there is no 
substantial addition of new content. Thus authorisation may be required only by the IC, the 
information may be released (to the community/emergency management partner 
organisations) and distributed to other levels of the control agency for information only.  
 
Review DIC role as one of IMT integration. Historically, the role of Deputy Incident Controller 
(DIC) in Victoria has typically been taken by a member of the other combat agency, as a 
means of providing integration between agencies (i.e., in a DSE-led fire, the CFA would be 
the DIC). In some jurisdictions in Australia the role has been developed into an internal team-
boundary spanning role, where the DIC acts on behalf of the IC to facilitate integration 
between IMT sections. If the DIC were to take on this supra-ordinate information management 
role, under certain circumstances (e.g., complex incidents) this could include the role of being 
the interface between partner organisations.  
 
Consider developing a partner organisation role in the information unit. As noted, there has 
been considerable work in articulating and developing roles for personnel in the information 
unit to take responsibility for information flow to the general public. The same level of attention 
is needed in a role for facilitating information flow to partner agencies. 
 
Review appointment protocols for the Information Officer. The Information Unit guidelines 
suggest that the Information Unit may scale up well ahead of an IMT, with an Information 
Officer being appointed before other members of an IMT. This strategy is not well known and 
process employed to do this and the conditions of such appointment need to be clarified. 
 
Review activation of IFACC and roles. How an IFACC is activated is not clear in the 
documentation reviewed and it would be useful if this were clarified and then relevant 
components used in supporting documentation, such as the Information Unit Guidelines.  In 
terms of clarifying information dissemination roles, it might be valuable to leave information 
dissemination to support communities at the IMT level and develop the role of the IFACC as 
the point of contact with the MECC/DECC. 
 
Clarify the conditions for activating a DECC. Having knowledge within fire control agencies, 
particularly for personnel involved in local or regional levels, of the roles and purposes of the 
DECC and when such a coordinating mechanism comes into play would help with 
understanding the broader emergency management arrangements.  One issue repeatedly 
raised in the interviews was the problem of how a DECC operates when the boundaries (of 
fire agencies, government regions and police divisions) do not align. 
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Conduct further investigate as to why information flow between the fire-ground and the IMT 
continues to be problematic. The issue of getting timely information from the fire-ground 
continues to be problematic. The research reported here did not access any personnel who 
would be able to shed light on the blockages at this level. The DSE is working on this area in 
a separate project. Addressing this area of potential disconnect will bring considerable 
benefits. 
 
Consider the role of the information unit in providing non-operational information to fire-
ground personnel. This role for the Information Unit is outlined in the Information Unit 
guidelines as well as in the AIIMS documentation. However, there seems to have been no 
attention given to it to date. Information Unit personnel did report that they received 
complaints from fire-ground personnel about not having an overall picture of what was 
happening. 
 
8.3 Partner organisation information needs  
Develop partner information templates. The type of information required by partner 
organisations has commenced development in this report. Templates could be developed to 
service particular types of information needs by emergency management partners, in the 
same way to that undertaken to support communities.  
 
Develop IIP for information flow to external partners and to represent information needs more 
dynamically. Alternatively, the Information Plan developed could contain information types 
relevant to emergency management partner organisations and circulated to them. The IIP 
could also be more dynamic in that it could represent different priorities depending on the 
phase of the fire event. 
 
Review advice about MECC activation protocols. The documentation regarding how an 
Incident Controller requests activation of a MECC are not widely known. Explanation of this, 
particularly the subsequent role of the Information Officer in managing the interface would be 
helpful. 
 
Clarify protocols in periods of escalation. The information flow responsibilities in periods of 
escalation appear to be under-developed, particularly the integration between the various 
layers in fire-control agency coordination and support and their interface responsibility with 
the Emergency Management Coordination and support functions.  
 
Review levels of authorisation for information dissemination. At present there is the need for 
multiple authorisation of information dissemination tools. For example, when information is 
going to the VBIL or onto the internet, it needs to travel from the fire-ground and through each 
of the layers of the fire control agency. Certain types of information may be identified in terms 
of their level of approval required, with authorisation pushed down to the lowest possible 
level. 
 
Clarify authority in IMT/IFACC information unit relationships. The current Information Unit 
guidelines refer to enabling activities occurring in the IFACC and decisional activities 
occurring in the IMT. However, these seems to be an added layer of bureaucracy that may 
inhibit timeliness.  
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8.4 Facilitating information flows 
Clarify information flows in the absence of a MECC. There seemed to be some confusion 
among emergency services liaison officers about whether a MECC is always in existence and 
what happens if one is not yet in place. 
 
Further develop understanding of partner needs. There is a need to continue to build up 
understanding of the information needs of emergency management partner organisations and 
the issues they confront. This could occur through a more comprehensive and more widely 
distributed survey that could then be used as a mechanism for facilitating dialogue and further 
improvements.  
 
Develop system safety health indicators with emergency management partner organisations. 
This data could feed into a set of agreed indicators of what to look for to know how 
coordinated information is flowing. Such indicators could then provide objective evidence 
about levels of improvements in the system. 
 
Develop more information mapping scenarios. Identify more scenarios where information flow 
is needed and map those to identify linkages needed and relevant areas of prioritisation. 
These could provide the basis for the development of guidelines similar to that developed 
around traffic management points. These could also be used as a means of reaching 
agreement with particular emergency management partner organisations on modalities used, 
templates needed and areas for prioritisation. 
 
Ratify information mapping scenarios. The scenarios here have been developed through 
consultations with individual representatives of the partner agencies, and thus they may not 
necessarily represent formal policy. These need to be ratified and can form the basis of 
further articulation of guidelines, similar to those developed in the case of managing 
information flow needed for traffic management points. 
 
Consult in relation to the findings of this report. The particularities of information contained in 
this report are likely to be conditional and in need of adjustment. It is suggested that the report 
be made available to emergency management partner organisations for comment and 
feedback for modification. 
 
 
This report has mapped the flow of information during fire-related emergency events and 
identified key areas for improvement in information flows. Given the complexity of emergency 
incident management, it is not surprising that the arrangements involved are both complex 
and multifaceted. There are many different communities of interest with overlapping, though 
unique, information needs.  
 
As this report has shown, the DSE are but one partner in a complex web of emergency 
management arrangements. Many issues raised here are generic and represent state-level 
issues. Some are quite specific. In attempting to come to grips with this complexity, it is hoped 
that the contents of this report provide opportunities to further develop the platform needed for 
the achievement of integrated and coordinated communication within a resilient emergency 
management framework. 
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